Abstract. Many decidability results are known for non-recursive cryptographic protocols, where the protocol steps can be expressed by simple rewriting rules. Recently, a tree transducer-based model was proposed for recursive protocols, where the protocol steps involve some kind of recursive computations. This model has, however, some limitations: (1) rules are assumed to have linear left-hand sides (so no equality tests can be performed), (2) only finite amount of information can be conveyed from one receive-send action to the next ones. It has been proven that, in this model, relaxing these assumptions leads to undecidability. In this paper, we propose a formalism, called selecting theories, which extends the standard non-recursive term rewriting model and allows participants to compare and store arbitrary messages. This formalism can model recursive protocols, where participants, in each protocol step, are able to send a number of messages unbounded w.r.t. the size of the protocol. We prove that insecurity of protocols with selecting theories is decidable in NEXPTIME.
Introduction
Formal verification of cryptographic protocols has been very successful in finding flaws in published cryptographic protocols (see [14, 7] for an overview). Although the general verification problem is undecidable [10, 1, 11] , there are important decidable variants [9, 10, 16] . One of them is the insecurity problem of protocols analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions, in presence of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder [16, 6, 5, 8] . In this case, one assumes that actions performed by participants during the course of the protocol execution are simple and can be described by single rewrite rules of the form t → s. Such a rule is intended to specify receive-send action of a principal who after receiving a message tθ, for some ground substitution θ, replies sθ. However, in many protocols, participants perform more complicated, recursive computations which cannot be expressed by simple rewrite rules. Examples of protocols of this kind are Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE), the Recursive Authentication (RA) protocol [4] , and the A-GDH.2 protocol [2] . We will call protocols that involve some kind of iterative or recursive computations recursive protocols.
Recently, a tree transducer-based model was proposed for recursive protocols [13, 12] . Tree transducers seem to be a natural choice in the context of recursive cryptographic protocols. The proposed model has, however, the following limitations: (1) rules are assumed to have linear left-hand sides, so no equality tests can be performed, (2) only finite amount of information can be conveyed from one receive-send action to the next ones. Moreover, these assumptions cannot be relaxed without losing decidability. In some cases, these limitations can make modeling of protocols inconvenient or even impossible. For example, the RA protocol, which was chosen in [13] and [12] to illustrate the tree transducer-based protocol model, has rules with non-linear left-hand sides and had to be slightly modified. It should be mentioned that both equality tests for messages of arbitrary size and the possibility of storing arbitrary messages can be easily expressed in the standard term rewriting-based model.
The goal of this paper is to provide a model which can express some recursive computations, without limiting the possibility of compare and store messages. In fact, in many cases the expression power of tree transducers is more than sufficient, so one could ask, whether there is some restricted class of tree transducers which can be used to model protocols, preserving the ability of parties to compare and store messages. One can, however, prove that these assumption cannot be relaxed even, if we consider very weak forms of tree transducers (or any similar formalism) which allow us to model the following basic kinds of computations: (a) list mapping -for an input which is an encoded list {[t 1 , . . . t n ]} k , produce an encoded list {[t 1 , . . . , t n ]} k , where, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the term t i is the result of applying some simple rewrite rule to t i , (b) mapping functional symbols -replace functional symbols of a given term with functional symbols of the same arity, preserving the exact structure of the term (distinct occurrences of a symbol need not be replaced with the same symbol).
The model presented in this paper can express recursive protocols, where participants, in each protocol step, can send a number of messages unbounded w.r.t. the size of the protocol. Each of these messages is the result of applying some simple rewriting rule to some subterm of the messages received so far. So called selecting theories are used to determine which rewriting rule should be applied to which terms. Participants are able to store and compare arbitrary messages, like in the case of standard term rewritingbased approach. We assume that keys used in symmetric and public key encryption are constants. Clearly, in our model, one cannot model computations described in the items (a) and (b) above. One can, however, model actions like for instance: for a list [t 1 , . . . , t n ] produce and send the list [t 1 , . . . , t n ], where, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the term t i is the result of applying some simple rewrite rule to t i . It is possible, because from the point of view of the Dolev-Yao intruder, the effect of sending [t 1 , . . . , t n ] is the same as the effect of sending terms t 1 , . . . , t n separately. The key fact here is that the result list is not encrypted, which is the case, when protocols like IKE or RA are considered. In the paper, we show how to model the RA protocol in our framework. Because the formalism can express protocols with non-linear left-hand sides of rules, we model this protocol without changes. We prove that insecurity of protocols with selecting theories with respect to bounded number of sessions decidable in NEXPTIME.
Preliminaries
Let T (Σ, V ) denote the set of terms over the signature Σ and the set of variables V . A term is ground, if it does not contain variables. A (ground) substitution is a mapping from variables to (ground) terms, which, in a natural way, is extended to a mapping from term to terms. We denote the set of subterms of t by sub(t).
For a given signature Σ, a term-DAG D is a labelled directed acyclic ordered graph such that, if a node v is labelled with a function symbol f of arity n, then it has n ordered immediate successors v 1 , . . . , v n . In such a case we write v = D f (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and we say that v is a parent of v i (for each i = 1, . . . , n), and v i is a child of v. We define also the notion of descendant in the usual way. For a term-DAG D, and a vertex
Let Σ be a signature, V be a set of variables, and P be a set of unary predicate symbols. If p ∈ P , and t ∈ T (Σ, V ), then p(t) is an atomic formula. An atomic formula p(t) is ground, if t is ground. A unary Horn theory is a finite set of clauses of the form a 0 ← a 1 , . . . , a n , where a 0 , . . . , a n are atomic formulas.
We will use the following notation. Let T be a unary Horn theory, let A, B be sets of ground atomic formulas. We write A T B, if there exists a proof of B with respect to T assuming A, i.e. a sequence a 1 , . . . , a n of atomic formulas such that each element of B occurs in a 1 , . . . , a n , and, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have either 
The Formal Model
Protocols with Selecting Theories. Messages are ground terms over the signature Σ consisting of constants (atomic messages such as principal names, nonces, keys), the unary function symbol hash(·) (hashing), and the following binary function symbols:
·, · (pairing), {·} · (symmetric encryption), and {|·| } · (public key encryption). We assume that keys used to encrypt messages are constants 1 . We assume that there is a bijection · −1 on atomic messages which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public) key k −1 . We assume that Σ contains the constant c 0 known to the intruder and the constant Sec (a secret). We will sometimes omit ·, · and write, for instance, {t, s} k instead of { t, s } k .
Let Q and R be disjoint sets of pop predicate symbols and push predicate symbols, respectively. A selecting theory Φ over (Q, R) is a set of clauses of the forms
where I / ∈ Q ∪ R is a predicate symbol, q, q 1 , . . . , q n ∈ Q, r, r ∈ R, f ∈ Σ is a function symbol of arity n, and x, x 1 , . . . , x n are variables. Clauses of the form (1), called pop clauses, have an auxiliary role: they can simulate runs of any finite tree automaton. The information about which states (predicate symbols) can be assigned to a term can be used in (2) and (3), which provides a regular look-ahead. Clauses of the form (2), called push clauses, transfer some information (predicate symbols) from a term to its subterms. Clauses of the form (3), called send clauses, select terms to be sent (the predicate symbol I means that the term is sent and thus it is known to the intruder).
Let Φ be a selecting theory over (Q, R). For a term t and r ∈ R ∪ {I }, we define the set of terms selected by Φ, r(t) Φ = {s | r(t) Φ I (s)}. A rule over (Q, R) has the form t → r(s), where t, s are terms and r ∈ R ∪ {I }. The intended meaning of such a rule is that a principal, after receiving a term tθ, for some ground substitution θ, sends all the terms from the set r(sθ) Φ . Note that the number of terms which are sent in one step of a protocol is not bounded by the size of the protocol, it is only bounded by the size of the message sθ. Because (for any Φ) we have I (s) Φ = {s}, each simple non-recursive rewrite rule t → s can be easily expressed in our formalism by t → I (s).
, for a set of variables V , and every variable in s i occurs in t 1 , . . . , t i . A protocol over (Q, R) is a pair (P, Φ), where P is a finite set of principals over (Q, R) and Φ is a selecting theory over (Q, R).
Example. Now, we show how to model the Recursive Authentication (RA) protocol [4] in our formalism. This protocol has been analyzed using theorem provers [15, 3] . In [13] and [12] a version of this protocol has been expressed in the tree transducer-based model (the original version has rules with non-linear left hand sides which cannot be expressed in this model). In the presentation of the protocol we follow [13] and [12] . Because, as it was mentioned above, non-recursive receive-send actions can be modeled in our formalism in a straightforward way, we will only describe the only recursive action of the protocol. In this action, the server S receives a sequence of requests of pairs of principals who want to obtain session keys. In response, S generates certificates containing the sessions keys. For instance, suppose that S receives So, suppose that P 0 , . . . , P n are principals, S = P n , and K i is the long-term key shared by P i and S. The recursive action of S can be described by the rule x → r(x) with the selecting theory over (∅, {r}) given by the following set of clauses. where the constant K ij is the key for secure communication of P i and P j . Note that this theory does not use a regular look-ahead, and uses only one push symbol r.
Attacks. In the Dolev-Yao model [9] , the intruder have the entire control over the network. He can intercept and memorize messages, generate new messages and send them to participants with a false identity. We express the ability of the intruder to generate (derive) new messages from a given set of messages by the theory T I in Figure 1 , where the predicate symbol I is intended to describe the intruder knowledge. For a set A of messages, let I (A) = {I (t) | t ∈ A}. We will say that the intruder can derive a message
Now, we give a definition of an attack for a bounded number of sessions. In an attack, the intruder nondeterministically chooses an execution order for the protocol steps and then produces input messages for the protocol rules. These input messages have to be derived from the intruder's initial knowledge and the output messages obtained so far. The aim of the intruder is to derive the secret message Sec. If some number of interleaving sessions of a protocol is to be analyzed, then these sessions have to be encoded into the protocol, which is the standard approach when protocols are analyzed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions (see, for instance [16, 6] ).
Formally, given a protocol ({Π 1 , . . . , Π l }, Φ), a protocol execution scheme is a sequence of rules π = π 1 , . . . , π n such that each element of π can be assigned to one of the participants Π 1 , . . . , Π l , and, for each participant Π k (k = 1, . . . , l), the subsequence of the elements of π assigned to
is a protocol execution scheme, and σ is a ground substitution such that
Recall that c 0 is the only constant initially known to the intruder 3 . A protocol is insecure, if there exists an attack on it.
We end this section with the following, easy to prove lemma.
Lemma 1. A T I B iff there exists a proof of B with respect to T I assuming
A such that all the facts obtained by rules (6), (7) are before the facts obtained by rules (4), (5) .
ϕ, for each pop or push rule ϕ of Φ (15)
for each send rule
where p = I , if s is not a variable, and p = r I , otherwise. 
Main Result Theorem 1. Insecurity of protocols with selecting theories w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions is decidable in nondeterministic exponential time.
The remainder of this section is devoted to prove Theorem 1. In Subsections 4.1 and 4.2, the existence of an attack is expressed in a way which is more appropriate for the rest of the proof. In Subsection 4.3 we introduce the key notion of ADAG. ADAGs are labelled term-DAGs which can represent attacks. We show how to minimize ADAG, so that, if an ADAG exists, then there exists an ADAG of an exponential size, which gives rise to the nondeterministic exponential time algorithm for the insecurity problem.
The Theory of a Protocol
In this section we express the existence of an attack in a more uniform way, without using expressions of the form r(s) Φ . We use here the fact that both selecting theories and the intruder theory are unary horn theories. Moreover, Lemma 1 allows us to extend selecting theories in such a way that the clauses (6) and (7) of T I are not necessary.
In the following, Acc(t) denotes the set of elements of the form s/ K , where s is a subterm of t and K is a minimal set of keys sufficient to access s providing t is known. For example, if
Formally, we define Acc by the equations Acc(
Definition 1. Let (P, Φ) be a protocol over (Q, R). Let r I be a fresh predicate symbol. The theory Φ I of the protocol P consists of the rules given in Fig. 2 .
Note that the theory Φ I consists of rules of three types: (a) rules (10) and (11), called the intruder pop rules, (b) pop rules, (c) rules of the form (12)- (14) and (16) can simulate the intruder rules (6) and (7). Thus, one can prove the following characterization of the existence of an attack.
be a protocol execution scheme for P and σ be a substitution. The pair (π, σ) is an attack iff we have
where, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we putr i = r I , if r i = I , andr i = r i , otherwise.
Stage Theories
In this subsection, we express the existence of an attack using a stage theory of a protocol. In this theory, instead of representing the knowledge of the intruder by the predicate symbol I , the family of predicate symbols
is used to represent his knowledge at different stages of an attack.
Let (P, Φ) be a protocol over (Q, R) and
be a protocol execution scheme. Let K be the set containing the constant Sec and all the keys of P . A sequence e = e 1 , . . . , e m of elements of K ∪ {1, . . . , n} is called a stage sequence for π, if e contains all the elements Sec, 1, . . . , n, and whenever e i = k and e j = l, for i < j, then k < l. A stage sequence represents key elements of the intruder knowledge at consecutive stages of an attack. An element e i of such a sequence either represents a new key that can be used by the intruder at the i-th stage (if e i is a key), or, if e i = j, it express progress in the protocol execution, and it means that at the i-th stage the j-th step of the protocol has been executed, so the intruder can use terms from r j (s j σ) Φ .
Let K i = {a ∈ K | a = e j for some j ≤ i}. The stage theory for Φ and e, denoted by Φ e , is given in Figure 3 , where p (i) , for i = 0, . . . , m, and p ∈ R ∪ {r I , I}, are fresh predicate symbols. The predicate symbol I (k) is intended to describe the intruder knowledge at the k-th stage of an attack. The intended meaning of r (k) (t) is that the intruder is able to prove r(t) at the k-th stage.
be a protocol execution scheme and σ be a ground substitution. The pair (π, σ) is an attack iff there is a stage sequence e = e 1 , . . . , e m for π such that 
Proof. First, suppose that (23) holds, for some π, e, and σ, and that Γ is a proof of it. Let Γ 0 denotes the subsequence of Γ containing only facts of the form q(t), for q ∈ Q.
for each (generalized) push or send rule I (k1), . . . , (17), and Γ * ≤m is a proof of (18). Hence, (π, σ) is an attack. Now, suppose that we have an attack (π, σ). By Lemma 2, (17) and (18) hold. So, let Π i be a proof of (17), for i = 1, . . . , n, and let Π n+1 be a proof of (18). We split each Π k (for k = 1, . . . , (n + 1)) into the maximal (w.r.t. its length) sequence Π k , for some k, and, otherwise, let e i be a, where I (a) is the last element ofΠ i . One can prove that the concatenation of Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n is a proof of (23).
We say that a fact I (i) (t) is stronger than I (j) (t), if i ≤ j. A proof is normal, if for each term t, it contains at most one fact of the form I (i) . The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 4. It holds (23) iff there is a normal proof of
where, for each k = 1, . . . , m, the fact ϕ k is stronger than ϕ k .
ADAGs
This section is the central part of the proof of Theorem 1. We give here the definition of an ADAG and link the existence of ADAGs with the existence of attacks (Lemma 5). Next, we show that if there exists an ADAG which represents an attack on a protocols, then there exists an ADAG of exponential size. Finally, as a consequence of the above, we obtain an NEXPTIME algorithm for deciding insecurity of protocols.
We will assume that selecting theories have the following property: the push rules are flat, i.e. are of the form (2) with t = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are variables. We can do it without loss of generality, because, for any selecting theory, one can easily obtain an equivalent selecting theory with this property.
Definition 2.
Let D be a term-DAG over Σ with the set V of vertices, and let T be a set of terms over Σ and V. A function θ : (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and θ(t i ) = v i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Embeddings θ 1 and θ 2 are compatible, if for each variable x which is in the domain of both θ 1 and θ 2 , we have θ 1 (x) = θ 2 (x).
Let v ∈ V , and t ∈ T (Σ, V). By emb(t → v) we denote the unique embedding θ for {t} such that θ(t) = v (if it exists). Let v 1 , v 2 ∈ V , and t 1 , t 2 ∈ T (Σ, V). The terms (t 1 , t 2 ) embeds to (v 1 , v 2 ), if the embeddings emb(t 1 → v 1 ) and emb(t 2 → v 2 ) exist and are compatible. 
, and (t, t ) embeds to (v, v ). Proof. Suppose that there is an attack (π, σ). By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, there is a sequence e and a normal proof Γ of (24). Let D be the DAG representing all the terms of the form tσ, where t ∈ T P . For t ∈ T P , let α(t) be the vertex v such that v ⇒ tσ. For a vertex v of D, let δ(v) be the set of the predicate symbols p ∈ Q e such that p(
Lemma 5. If there is an attack (π, σ) on a protocol (P, Φ) then there is an
is a push or send clause of Φ e , t v = sσ, for some substitution σ, and q 1 (s σ), . . . , q l (s σ), p (s σ) occur in Γ before p(t v ), then  let β(v, p) = (v , ϕ) , where v is the vertex of D such that v ⇒ s σ (such a vertex exists, because s σ has to be a subterm of some s i σ). One can show that D, α, β, Φ, δ is an ADAG. Now, suppose that D, α, β, Ψ, δ is an ADAG for (Φ, π, e). Let σ(x) = t, where t is the term such that α(x) ⇒ t. We produce the following sequence of facts: First, we put all the facts of the form q(t), where v ⇒ t and q ∈ δ(v), for q ∈ Q, in such a way that q(t) is before q (t ), if t < t . Second, we put all the fact of the form r (i) (t), where v ⇒ t and r (i) ∈ δ(v), for r ∈ R ∪ {r I }, in such a way that p(t) is before p (t ), if t > t . Finally, we put all the fact of the form I (i) (t), where v ⇒ t and I (i) ∈ δ(v), in such a way that p(t) is before p (t ), if t < t . One can prove that this sequence is a normal proof of (24) (note that Ψ is an instance of Φ, so each clause of Ψ e is an instance of a clause of Φ e ), which by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, implies that there exists an attack.
Lemma 5 is a crucial step of our construction, because it characterizes the existence of an attack by a structure which is defined by some local properties. Now, we will describe how to minimize ADAGs, roughly speaking, by merging vertices which are indistinguishable from the point of view of this local properties. We proceed in three steps given by Lemmas 6, 7, and 8 below (proofs of these lemmas are given in the separate sections). To formulate these lemmas we need the following definitions. Lemma 6 states that each ADAG can be transformed to a simple ADAG. Having a simple ADAG, we can minimize the number of its goals, which is expressed by the following lemma. It allows us to minimize the size of the whole ADAG, as is stated in Lemma 8. , e) with an exponentially bounded set of goals (w.r.t. the size of (P, Φ)), then there is an ADAG for (Φ, π, e) of an exponentially bounded size.
Let (P, Φ) be a protocol, and let D = D, α, β, Ψ, δ be an ADAG for (Φ, π, e). A vertex v of D is bounded, if v = α(t), for some t ∈ sub(T P
)i = k. Let G >k (D) = i>k G i (D). An ADAG D is simple, if, whenever u / ∈ B(D) is a descendant of v ∈ G i (D), then u / ∈ G >i (D). LetΦ = Φ ∪ {C | C is
Lemma 8. Let (P, Φ) be a protocol over (Q, R). If
Lemmas 5, 6, 7, and 8 have the following consequence. Corollary 1. Let (P, Φ) be a protocol, and let π be a protocol execution scheme. There is an attack (π, σ), for some σ, iff there exists an ADAG for (Φ, π, e) , for some e, of an exponential size w.r.t. the size of the protocol.
The Algorithm. To decide insecurity of a given protocol (P, Φ), we guess an attack skeleton π, a stage sequence e, and an ADAG for (Φ, π, e) of exponential size w.r.t. the size of the protocol. Correctness of this algorithm is given by the Corollary 1. The algorithm works in NEXPTIME, which concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
An easy to obtain lower bound is DEXPTIME, because the problem of the emptiness of the intersection of regular tree languages, which is DEXPTIME-hard, can be easily reduced to the problem of deciding protocols with selecting theories (in the reduction, pop-clauses of selecting theories are used).
Proof of Lemma 6
We start this section with technical definitions used in this section and in the following ones. For an ADAG 
If u is a goal and
In order to prove Lemma 6, we construct a sequence
It is easy to show that D 0 is an ADAG for (Φ, π, e) and ( * ), ( * * ) hold for D 0 . Now, assume that ( * ) and ( * * ) hold for
where W i is the set of fresh vertices of the formv, for v ∈ A. Now, suppose that v = Di−1 f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) . For each i = 1, . . . , n, , 1), . . . , h(v, n) ). For v ∈ A with v = Di−1 f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) we putv = Di f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) The construction of δ i . For v ∈ A we define the set R(u) ⊆ R ∪ {r I } by the following equivalence: r ∈ R(u) iff there exist vertices w / ∈ A and v ∈ A such that h(w, k) =v, for some k, and (w, r
The construction of
where β i−1 (v, r) = (u, r ), and w = u, if u / ∈ A, and w =û, otherwise. v , r) . Note that, because r ∈ δ i (u), we have r ∈ δ i+1 (w). Since, by the inductive hypothesis, ( * * ) holds for D i−1 , it is enough to consider two cases: One can prove that D i is an ADAG and ( * * ) holds. Now we will show that ( * ) holds.
. We also have thatǔ is a descendant ofv, which contradicts the inductive hypothesis. Now, assume that j = i. Note that, for any v ∈ A, the vertexv is not a descendant of any v ∈ G i (D i ). So, suppose that u ∈ A. In this case the definition of
Di , and because u / ∈ B(D i ), u is free and u is reachable from α(t i ). It means that there is a path
and, for each l = 1, . . . , l,
, so it cannot contain I (j) for any j = i − 1), and if k > l, then by inductive hypothesis, we also have u / ∈ G >j (D i ). It concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
One can also prove, using very similar argumentation to the one in the last paragraph of the proof above, the following fact.
Proof of Lemma 7
We will construct a sequence D n , . . . , D 0 of ADAGs, starting with D n = D. We will show that G ≥i (D i ) is exponentially bounded, which, for i = 0, means that the set of goals of D 0 is exponentially bounded. All the ADAGs of this family share the same α,Φ, and the same set of vertices. So, let
. Let h be a function which for the equivalence class
Using Lemma 9 and the fact that, for u
, one can show that each u ∈ G i (D i+1 ) can have at most exponentially many descendants in G, and hence, the size of G is exponentially bounded as well. LetḠ 
. We consider two cases. In the both we get a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 8
For an ADAG Because |U | = |U (D 0 )| is exponentially bounded and N = |U |, to complete the proof it is enough to show that each U k is exponentially bounded. Let M denote the number of goals of the resulting ADAG (which is equal to the number of goals of D 0 ) and K denote the number of distinct possible values of δ. One can show that each path in U k is not longer than M · K (since vertices from U k can have at most one parent, the values of ρ(u) can only decrease along a path). One can also show that, if v, v ∈ U k are not on the same path, then ρ(v) ∩ ρ(v ) = ∅, and thus, the number of distinct (maximal) paths in U k is bounded by M . Hence, the size of U k is bounded by M 2 · K which is exponential w.r.t. the size of (P, Φ).
Conclusions
We have introduced a new formalism to model recursive cryptographic protocols. In this formalism, one can express protocols such that participants are able to send many messages in one step, to compare, and to store messages. Usefulness of the proposed model is illustrated by an example. We have proven that the insecurity problem of protocols with selecting theories w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions is decidable in NEXPTIME.
The proof technique used in this paper (stage theories, representing attacks by ADAGs) is, in its outline, an adaptation of the method used in [17] to prove NP-completeness of insecurity of (non-recursive) protocols, where the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular language of terms. In [17] , however, the minimization of an ADAG is relatively simple and straightforward, whereas in this paper, it is the main technical difficulty.
Future work. The exact complexity of the problem of deciding protocols with selecting theories is not known. Another open problem is decidability of security of protocols with selecting theories and with complex keys.
